(Blogspot has forced a new writing format on us. I'll have to figure out how to fix the links later.)
I had no issues with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/dp/1677949775/ref=as_sl_pc_tf_til?tag=onecos-20&linkCode=w00&linkId=78473c036a67c8b61ab6a4b20636ca57&creativeASIN=1677949775>Reality</a> until the second half, which makes the traditional arguments for God's absolute immutability. I appreciate the sentiment, but immutable means immutable, and -- well, maybe you're different from me, but I find it impossible to relate to something immutable, in particular, because something immutable literally cannot relate to me.
It seems to me that the traditional arguments for divine immutability should be understand in a negative rather than positive sense, in that they're more about preventing misunderstanding than conveying an unambiguous understanding.
In short, everything in the world is subject to deterioration, entropy, decay, etc. Obviously God is not like that. But why go to the opposite extreme and say that he's incapable of change? What if -- and we're just spitballin' it here -- the existence of bad change doesn't imply that all change is bad? What if there's a type of change that doesn't at all imply privation or incompletion, but rather, is a perfection?
Love, for example. Or maybe the best surprise ever. Forever and ever.
Another issue I have with the scholastic arguments about the nature of God is that they could equally apply to Allah -- not just vis a vis immutability, but omniscience and omnipotence, i.e., total knowledge and absolute will. Of course, I'm familiar with arguments that try to reconcile human freedom and divine foreknowledge, but these always strike me as special pleading.
You'll hear it argued, for example, that God's omniscience is analogous to how a parent can know what the child is about to do, even though the child is free not to do it. But that's a massive category error. It's not even a good analogy, because a reliable hunch isn't the same as absolute certitude. Nor does the parent create the child with absolute and unbending foreknowledge of everything he will ever say, do, or think.
Another issue I have revolves around the question of Trinity. If God goes to all the trouble of telling us about his interior life, it seems to me that we should take it into consideration before making dogmatic and a priori argument from our end.
From down here we can easily, with our natural reason, conclude that God is immutable. Nor, prior to God revealing it, did anyone ever argue that what we call "God" is actually three persons in an eternal <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perichoresis">perichoresis</a>.
The question is, does the Trinity change any of the traditional arguments, or is it irrelevant? To me, it goes to the very essence of why the Christian God doesn't at all resemble Allah, nor the impersonal Brahman of Vedanta, which is likewise totally detached from human concerns..
I have a lot of disagreements with <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/1573928151?ie=UTF8&tag=onecos-20&camp=1789&linkCode=xm2&creativeASIN=1573928151">Charles Hartshorne</a>, but his solution to this problem bangs my gong. It's not just that it makes intellectual and emotional sense, but it makes a whole array of absurdities and pseudo-problems disappear.
Of course, this doesn't mean he's correct. But it sure makes God more approachable and relatable, and in my opinion, does nothing to diminish the divine glory and all-around awesomeness. Frankly, I consider immutability to be a character flaw. It's why a lot of people end up needing psychotherapy later in life: unresponsive <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harry_Harlow#Monkey_studies">wire monkey</a> parents.
Yes, we've discussed this in the past, but not for about seven years, so let's review the argument. In Hartshorne's view, a fundamental error occurs when we take two contradictory terms -- say, change and immutability -- and apply only one of them to God:
one decides in each case which member of the pair is good or admirable and then attributes it (in some supremely excellent or transcendent form) to deity, while wholly denying the contrasting term.
Let's take the polarity "being-becoming." In the traditional view, being is privileged. But what if this isn't a polarity or dualism but an eternal complementarity? Isn't this what the Trinity is trying to tell us? "Father <---> Son <---> Holy Spirit." Isn't that a hint? Aren't they, you know, related? And aren't we invited to participate in that relationship, i.e., to relate to the eternal relating via the outpouring of grace?
The clock is starting to run out, but we'll have much more to say about this in the next post. We'll end with a passage from Hartshorne:
There is good or superior unity and bad or inferior unity....
God is a being whose versatility of becoming is unlimited, whose potentialities of content embrace all possibilities, whose sensitive responsiveness surpasses that of all other individuals, actual or possible.
That may not be orthodox, but at least I can relate to it.
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