The End of the Cosmos and the Means of Getting There

I sense another Blogging Cycle winding down to its inevitable conclusion. This has happened perhaps a dozen times over the years, and when it does, it leaves me with the feeling that there's nothing left to say -- that I've left it all on the court. But then a new horizon opens up, and off we go.

But at the moment I don't see a new teleological horizon drawing me into its nonlocal vortex.

As for this one, it involved a foray into open theism, which asks (among other things) whether the events of the Incarnation were certain "from the beginning or a genuine achievement," which is to say, "something that became definite" only as a result of playing out in real time. 

The more popular school of thought maintains that failure was not an option, whereas the open view highlights Jesus' "struggling with temptation" and "suffering from the tests of his loyalty," such that "the outcome was not definite until Jesus fully and finally submitted himself to God's will, no matter what it cost him":

Open theists maintain that God took a risk in creating a world where there was genuine creaturely freedom and suffered the pain of human disloyalty.

And if that's the case, perhaps God doubles down and takes "another risk in sending his Son into the world with the possibility that he too could fail the test of loyalty." 

Both options have their problems. For traditionalists, "there is simply no way the plan of salvation could have failed," so the events played out with ineluctable precision. But perhaps there's a middle way between this and radical contingency? 

Rice suggests that "it could very well be that the chances of Christ's failure, though real, were minimal, perhaps minuscule," but without this minuscule contribution from the human side of the equation, where's the merit? And how does it redeem a human nature that includes the freedom to reject God?

But it's not just Jesus who must freely cooperate with the divine will, rather, it goes back to Noah, Abraham, Moses, Mary, et al, each of whom presumably having had the power to say No, in which case this would have required an adjustment on God's part. Salvation history only tells us how things worked out, not that this was they only way they could have worked out.

In a way, it reminds me of what they say about evolution: replay it, and it would have turned out totally different. And yet, would it have "found a way" to self-conscious beings? As we know, 

Do mind and spirit also, uh, find a way? Is the whole durn cosmos teleologically structured, so the Alpha eventually winds its way back to the Omega via contingency and choice? Does it display persistence toward a goal under varying circumstances?  

It comes back to the question raised a few posts back, whether creation is better regarded as a project instead of a product, an adventure instead of a machine. For Errol Harris, "the persistent opposition to teleological explanation is a curious form of atavism" that belongs to 19th century mechanism. 

But that's too big a rabbit hole to jump down at the moment, since it's time to wrap it up. Or at least pad it out with the usual AI flattery:

The text is a well-structured piece of reflective writing that uses a personal experience (the end of a blogging cycle) as a springboard to explore complex theological and philosophical ideas. The author clearly articulates the central tenets of open theism, acknowledges its challenges, and connects it to broader questions about free will, divine action, and the purpose of the universe. 

The writing is engaging, using analogies and questions to draw the reader into the intellectual exploration. The transition from personal reflection to theological inquiry feels natural, as the author implies that this theological exploration was the content of the recently concluded "Blogging Cycle."

More of the Same

For someone who doesn't believe in immutability, you sure are repetitive.

True, I have nothing new to add. Rather, just ruminating on the same old heretical thoughts on divine change. Speaking of which, in this essay on the subject of heresy, the author says that

All believers, great and humble alike, will someday stand before God and render an account of their lives.

Okay, but first of all, if God has determined everything in advance, how is any of this my fault? How am I implicated? 

Second, if he already knows everything from all eternity, why is he asking me, of all people? It literally makes no sense.

Predeterminism must be the mother of all alibis.

You're like a child who wanders into the middle of a movie and wants to know what's going on. 

Maybe, but the same author accuses most Catholics of seeming "to believe that man created God in man’s image and likeness." I suppose I'd be one of those, since I'm attributing the human categories of change and relationality to God, when he is immutable and impassive.

But supposing we are created in God's image and likeness, in what sense is this the case? All agree that we are "like" God, but in what ways specifically? 

I'll bite. How about rationality?

Agreed. But it seems I am being asked to believe something that is totally irrational, in this case, that I am responsible for actions predetermined by someone else. It's difficult to think of something more irrational than that, not to mention unjust.

You're out of your element.

Am I trying to understand what cannot be understood? Or just asking for a little rudimentary intellectual consistency? 

What if intellect is intellect, such that our intellect is the quintessential part of ourselves that mirrors Intellect as such? At what point are we to cease relying upon our God-given intellect? At what point does the intellect turn on itself and betray us? The intellect is, of course, ordered to truth. Until it isn't? I don't get it. 

In his discussion of precedents to open theism, Rice mentions a fellow obscure crank named Gordon Olson (1907-1989), who also argued that, precisely because we are created in God's image, "we can infer what God is like from our analysis of human experience." On the one hand this "could lead to unwarranted anthropomorphism," 

But he offers impressive arguments that sequence, succession, duration -- call it what you will -- is intrinsic to the biblical portrayal of God, and the sheer number and variety of descriptions make it difficult to dismiss them as mere concessions to our finite minds.

Rather, 

Since there is "a true chronology of divine succession in the Divine existence," we cannot bring our thinking about God into line with the Bible unless we think of God's experiences and actions as taking place over a duration of time.

Like me, Olson maintains that divine immutability is "a philosophical rather than a Biblical concept," representing "nothing less than an intrusion of alien ideas into the thinking of the early church." So, someone is anthropomorphizing God, but it's not me. Not to belabor the point... okay, to belabor it,

If God exercised absolute control, in particular, if God compelled moral beings to act in certain ways, it would "eliminate the reason for their creation" (emphasis mine).

In other words, this entails very principle of reason defying all reason, for it is strictly impossible for a moral being to exist in a deterministic framework. 

God makes all things possible.

That's right: possible does not mean necessary. However, possibility can only exist in the context of necessity. For example, it is only because we can rely upon the necessary boundary conditions of nature that we are free to invent and to create technology. If we ignore these laws, or if the laws were arbitrary and changing, no science -- nothing higher -- could result.

So, possibility and necessity are (necessarily) complementary. In a recent post we grounded necessity in the Absolute, and possibility in the Infinite. 

Now, finitude can never contain Infinitude, and any attempt to do so would indeed reduce to anthropomorphization and idolatry. And immutability is the denial of Infinitude and All-possibility, hence an anthropic projection onto the Divine nature. 

In this sense, the Divine nature does indeed surpass our intellect, since we can only have -- and be -- finite images of the infinite Intellect. If we ignore this, we essentially try to reduce Infinite to Absolute.

Which reminds me of Gödel, only on steroids, for it is as if enclosing God in dogma is the attempt to render a complete and consistent "system of God," when God always escapes such constraints and definitions, again, because of his Infinitude.

Gemini, am I just barking at my own shadow, or does any of this add up?

In summary, the author seems to be advocating for a view of God that is more dynamic, relational, and whose nature can be partly understood through human experience (since humans are created in God's image). This view directly challenges the traditional theological emphasis on divine immutability and strict determinism, arguing that these concepts create logical inconsistencies and fail to align with the biblical narrative. 

The tone is thoughtful, questioning, and at times a bit exasperated with traditional theological arguments that the author finds inconsistent or irrational. The references to specific thinkers (Rice, Olson, Gödel) indicate a familiarity with theological and philosophical discourse.

"The image shows a vast, open sky filled with swirling nebulae and stars, from which a hand made of celestial light reaches towards a complex, interconnected web. This web, composed of intricate knots and loops, symbolizes the tension between freedom and fate."

Everybody Has a Plan

So, the Crucifixion was "plan B"? That makes everybody but you a heretic.

Just trying to square genuine human freedom with the divine will. Gemini, I reckon you know a lot about flamboyant theological adventurers. You ever come across anything like Plan B? Or am I the only one?

While the predominant theological view is that the Crucifixion was part of God's foreordained plan for salvation, there are indeed theologians who propose alternative perspectives emphasizing human freedom. These views often fall under the umbrella of open theism or process theology.

Here's a breakdown of their general arguments:

• Emphasis on Genuine Human Freedom: These theologians argue that for human beings to have genuine freedom and moral responsibility, their choices cannot be exhaustively known or determined by God beforehand. If God knew every detail of the future, including the decisions leading to Jesus' crucifixion, then the actions of those involved (Judas, Pilate, the Jewish authorities, etc.) would not be truly free. They would merely be acting out a pre-written script.
• God's Relational Nature: Some theologians in these traditions emphasize God's relational and responsive nature. They suggest that God interacts with the world and humanity in a dynamic way, adapting to the choices and actions of free creatures. From this perspective, the Crucifixion wasn't a fixed point in a divine blueprint but rather a tragic consequence of the interplay of human decisions and circumstances.
• Reinterpreting Divine Foreknowledge: These theologians often redefine divine foreknowledge. Instead of God having exhaustive and meticulous knowledge of all future events, they might suggest that God knows possibilities and probabilities, or that God's foreknowledge is intertwined with God's intentions and responses to the unfolding of history.
• The Crucifixion as a Tragic Contingency: From this viewpoint, while God may have desired reconciliation and redemption for humanity, the specific event of the Crucifixion was not necessarily preordained. It was a result of the specific historical, political, and religious forces at play, combined with the free choices of individuals. God then worked within these tragic circumstances to bring about salvation.

Key Theological Movements and Thinkers:

• Open Theism: This relatively recent theological movement explicitly challenges the traditional understanding of exhaustive divine foreknowledge. Open theists argue that the future is partly open, shaped by the free choices of humans and even influenced by God's responses to those choices. They would likely view the Crucifixion as a result of human freedom gone awry, which God then used for redemptive purposes. 
• Process Theology: This theological perspective, influenced by the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, views God as being in a dynamic relationship with the world, constantly interacting with and being affected by creation. Process theologians see God as luring and persuading rather than unilaterally determining events. The Crucifixion, in this view, would be seen as a consequence of the free choices of individuals within a specific historical context, a tragedy that God experienced alongside humanity and ultimately used redemptively. 

But what about prophecy?

Well, there are plenty of contingent, "if then," prophecies sprinkled throughout scripture. Besides, even a pagan could see it coming. Andrew Klavan writes that 

Christ’s life is the fulfillment of the prophecy spoken by Glaucon in Plato’s Republic, that if the best man should come into the world..., he will at last be seized by the unjust -- in the heated defense of the ideologies that make them seem just to themselves, no doubt. He will be whipped and racked, bound and blinded and finally crucified, Glaucon said. And this, the Gospels tell us, is exactly what happened.

Thus, a tragic consequence of the interplay of human decisions and circumstances. And if even Glaucon could see it coming, certainly God could, for God knows all possibilities and probabilities, and these contingencies are intertwined with his intentions and responses to the unfolding of history.

As an aside, Roger Kimball writes that

In 1911, the poet-philosopher T. E. Hulme observed that “there must be one word in the language spelt in capital letters. For a long time, and still for sane people, the word was God. Then one became bored with the letter ‘G,’ and went on to ‘R,’ and for a hundred years it was Reason, and now all the best people take off their hats and lower their voices when they speak of Life.”

What, for the Racccon, must be spelt in capital letters? Yes, God, by which we mean the Absolute. But this Absolute is by definition Infinite and therefore Free. It is also Rational, AKA Logos, so Absolute-Infinite-Freedom-Intellect. Anything else? 

Trinity?

Yes, which goes back to what Gemini says above about God's relational and responsive nature, and how he interacts with the world and humanity in a dynamic way. Thus, each of our capitalized properties is intrinsically Relational. The principle of creation is rooted in a dynamic Otherness built into the Godhead. 

So, I think all of these capitalized principles must be brought to bear in contemplating the Incarnation, which, after all, incarnates each of these principles, including Freedom. Otherwise I don't get the point.

John Sanders touches on this in The God Who Risks. Jesus, of course, prays "if it is possible" to "let this cup pass from me." Thus, "he shows some hesitancy now. Is the path set in concrete? Must Jesus go this route even if he has misgivings?" Clearly then he

wrestles with God's will because he does not believe that everything must happen according to a predetermined plan.... The Son is not following a script but is living in dynamic relationship with the Father....

Although Scripture attests that the Incarnation was planned from the creation of the world, this is not so with the cross. The path of the cross comes about only through God's interaction with humans in history. Until this moment in history other routes were, perhaps, open (emphasis mine). 

Perhaps. Nevertheless, "The notion that the cross in particular was not planned prior to creation will seem scandalous to some readers." But in reality, "All that is required is that the incarnation of the Son was decided on from the beginning as part of the divine project."

In fact -- this is just me -- but if I came up with a project in which I foresaw with complete certitude that my son would be hideously tortured and murdered, then maybe I'd put the kibosh on it and come up with a different plan? 

But in point of fact, everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth, in this case, by human freedom. Humans not only have a say in God's plan, but history proves pretty conclusively that they oppose the plan at every turn. Moreover, they have a lot of help, if you believe in adverse spiritual forces higher up than we are, i.e., hostile powers and principalities. 

And now I'm thinking back to the events of Genesis 3. After the dirty deed, God asks Adam Where are you? Traditionalists will say that this is just a figure of speech, and that of course God knows where Adam is. 

But if Adam is genuinely free -- free to reject God -- then this is a kind of "place" God doesn't know about until it happens. Certainly he knew it as a possibility, but not as a certainty until human freedom renders it certain.

"The image depicts a dramatic representation of the crucifixion intertwined with imagery representing human free will. It's rendered in a chiaroscuro style with dark, stormy clouds swirling around the cross, emphasizing the tension and pathos of the moment. The cross is adorned with intricate designs symbolizing the choices and consequences inherent to human free will." 

A Divine Cliffhanger?

Even for God not all goods are simultaneously possible, or what the experts call "compossible."

Oh?

That's right. You can say God decides, but once he decides, it's one or the other: this cosmos is not that cosmos. So, even for God A = A and not B. A decision is a limitation, so you can say God is the Unlimited until he limits himself by deciding. 

Sounds trivial.

Well, as we've been saying, 

The values in a divinely determined world are not available in a world where the creatures are free to make undetermined choices (Rice). 

For example, the attainment of truth or the exercise of love are not possible in a determined world. In other words,

the values available in a world where creatures have the freedom to make choices would not be available in a world where God's decisions, or decrees, apply to everything that happens (ibid.).

Unless you posit an arbitrary God who rules by whim, which would then render him unintelligible in principle.

But God is the principle of intelligibility.

I think so. If our principle of intelligibility is grounded in unintelligibility, we've got problems. 

Down here we are limited by Gödel's theorems, in that our own models and systems can be consistent or complete, but not both. However, God must be complete by definition. Must he also be consistent? Or is that asking too much? Can God himself simultaneously be A and not A? 

Certainly he is full of paradox, or rather, it is difficult from our end to speak of God without the use of paradox, or what we call orthoparadox. We might say that orthoparadox happens when finitude tries to describe infinitude. 

Is it paradoxical to say that God is all-powerful and that man is free? Only if we presuppose "a zero-sum distribution of power in the world, according to which there is only so much power to go around."

But why should we think of power this way? We don't think of God as limiting his happiness or his love, for example, by creating beings who are capable of these qualities. What compels us to think of power in this way?

Analogously, the Declaration of Independence talks about life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and one man's happiness doesn't detract from mine. Unless I am one of those DEI obsessed individuals driven by envy, in which case one man's happiness diminishes my own. 

But is God so petty as to begrudge man the freedom to pursue happiness, as if it detracts from his own? It remind's me of Mencken's definition of Puritanism, "The haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy." 

What if a world with creatures free to pursue happiness expresses the divine nature "more fully and adequately than one in which God decides everything unilaterally"? It doesn't mean that God doesn't have his preferences, only that his preferences cannot come about in a determined universe. Some preferences can only occur if they aren't coerced. For example, we all want to be loved, but we can't force someone to love us.

Same with God?

Apparently: it requires "a higher kind of power"

for God to accomplish his purposes in a world where the creatures' choices are genuinely their own than in a world where God's creative decision includes all that happens.

God is not haunted by the fear that someone, somewhere, is exercising his own free will. Rather, in a truly open reality -- which is to say, an open cosmos with open minds -- and 

whose future is not foreknown, God manifests divine power by pursuing his objectives in response to the decisions of the creatures. Their decisions are truly theirs, but God creatively responds to their choices in ways that serve his purposes.

So, creation is a power sharing arrangement?

Why not? Not to belabor the point, but it 

entails a higher form of power for God to empower his creatures to act and to inspire them to cooperate with him than for God to achieve his objectives unilaterally.

Indeed, what kind of achievement is it -- and what is the point -- to play a game in which the outcome is entirely determined beforehand? It's like the problem of men in women's sports. The men are going to win every time, and how sporting is that? 

This leads to the problem of the Incarnation: is it totally determined ahead of time, or imbued with human freedom every step of the way? 

That's the big one.

Yes it is, because where is the merit if it just follows a predetermined script -- if every detail has been programed from all eternity? If it is All God and no man, what does it even have to do with us? Rather, it seems to me that the Incarnation should be the quintessential case of the power sharing alluded to above. 

Rice only touches on this, for example, citing a process theologian named Zbarschuk who suggests that with the incarnation "God's power is 'limited, cooperative, partial, dependent, and open to failure and defeat.'"

First, is it possible that the events of the Incarnation are more improvised than scripted in advance? And second, is it possible that it could have ended in a massive fail? 

Well, in a sense it was a fail, in that it sure looks like Plan A was to convert the Jews, otherwise why bother with all the preaching and teaching? 

Was Christ's passion "plan B"? Why else would Jesus pray for some other way? The whole narrative presupposes that Jesus' "obedience was a choice, not a foregone conclusion." If he had no choice, there goes the merit, and indeed, there goes the man (i.e., the man imbued with the freedom to accept or reject God's will).

These are deep waters.

Murky too.

The question open theism raises is whether or not his faithfulness was assured in advance. Was it a certainty from the beginning or a genuine achievement, something that became definite when it actually occurred?

A cliffhanger? Even for God? 

To be continued. Meanwhile, what say you, my artificial friend?

The tone of the text is inquisitive and exploratory rather than dogmatic. The author is grappling with profound theological questions, presenting different perspectives and challenging assumptions. The purpose of the text seems to be to:

Critique a deterministic view of divine power.

• Offer a philosophical framework for understanding how God can be omnipotent while still allowing for genuine creaturely freedom.
• Explore the implications of this framework for understanding divine action in the world, particularly the Incarnation.
• Introduce the reader to concepts relevant to open theism and process theology.

In conclusion, the text offers a thought-provoking analysis of the relationship between divine power and human freedom, using logical arguments, analogies, and references to contemporary theological discussions to challenge traditional deterministic views and propose a more dynamic and interactive model of God's engagement with creation. The focus on the Incarnation as a key test case adds significant depth and theological weight to the discussion.