Cosmotheandrism proposes an irreducible interior relationship between Cosmos, Anthropos, and Theos. This being the case, its null hypothesis would be that there are no such relationships, or that one of our three terms does not actually exist. We needn’t detain ourselves arguing over whether the Cosmos or Anthropos exist, nor whether they are related. The question is whether these two are related to the Theos, and whether the latter even exists. Thus, we could say that one null hypothesis of cosmotheandrism is atheism, the latter assumed to be true unless our theory can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that atheism is incorrect or even impossible.
There also exist religious “null hypotheses,” in the sense that one can prefer one religion over another, and insist that the truth of one entails the falsehood of all the others. However, such a preference cannot ultimately be based on scientific or philosophical objections, even though some religions are more philosophically coherent and plausible than others.
However, a-theism is the null hypothesis of all gods and all religions, such that no religion of any kind is even possible, much less plausible and coherent. Rather, religion explains nothing, and nothing explains religion except perhaps ignorance, stupidity, gullibility, mimesis, social contagion, mental illness, etc. Some even propose the existence of a “God gene,” in which case the atheist is evidently some kind of genetic mutant with a birth defect. But once one traverses down that path, there is no true or false anyway, just self-interested genes, whether those genes are interested in theism or atheism.
How is Atheism Possible?
We have already established that God is possible, or at least not impossible. The question is, is godlessness possible? The philosopher Charles Taylor correctly affirms that secularism is not just a matter of “less religion,” but essentially the displacement of one metaphysic for another. He refers to an implicit worldview as a “social imaginary,” but a secular social imaginary is no less imaginary than a religious one.
Specifically, the social imaginary is defined as the manner in which “ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings.” In the ancient world the collective social imaginary made atheism seem impossible, whereas in our day the social imaginary of vulgar scientism seems to render theism untenable, at least among secular sophisticates.
Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers no doubt felt a certain frisson at the prospect of breaking free of the existing socio-religious imaginary. However, it is anachronistic to characterize these thinkers as secular in the modern sense. Rather, most of them remained thoroughly religious but merely wanted to expand and supplement the religious social imaginary with discoveries from the new science. Only later did man begin imagining a social imaginary devoid of God.
But again, if Voegelin is correct, man qua man is always situated in the space between immanence and transcendence. We can pretend to flee this space in either direction, but the result will be another more or less adequate imaginary existing between these poles. For example, naturalism is a totally inadequate imaginary, in that it collapses the very space in which the Cosmos becomes luminous to itself.
Imagine no imaginary. It isn’t hard to do.
Actually, it is impossible to do — like trying to define “experience” in the absence of experience. We can imagine that we are free of any implicit imaginary, but that’s just another imaginary.
One of the first binary choices confronting the Anthropos is whether the Cosmos is a dynamically open system or self-enclosed and self-explanatory — in other words, whether its sufficient reason exists within or outside itself. There is no third option, so either we exist in a contingent Cosmos open to something transcending it, or in a self-sufficient universe reducible to the necessity of immanent matter in motion.
One of the most consequential differences between the two is that any form of ultimate meaning is strictly impossible in the case of a closed and necessary universe: if the latter is the sole reality, then it can have no significance. Only if the Cosmos is the appearance of a deeper reality can it acquire meaning and significance, in that it implies and “refers” to this more real reality. Is this latter possibility capable of disproof? If so, how is it that one is arguing from beyond a Cosmos that has no beyond? As we know from our Gödel, one can only pronounce upon a system from outside the system. As a result, we can only pretend to eliminate transcendence from any explanation of the Cosmos.
So atheism is a mug’s game?
Well, it is up to them to explain how to pull oneself up by the genes in order to know about our genes, or how to pull an immaterial intellect out of a material hat. How does one even speak of matter without transcending it? Good luck with that. We are all dealt a hand of genes, but to reduce truth to biology is overplaying our hand.
They want to sell us a bridge to reality while blowing up the bridge.
Either that or a bridge to unreality.
Which is not to say that religionists do not overplay their hands, because they almost always do, insofar as they absolutize their religion.
Nevertheless there is a bridge, specifically the one between intellect and intelligibility. Here again, science assumes the existence of this bridge, in the absence of which science itself is strictly impossible. So if one could disprove the existence of this bridge, then this would surely entail disproof of cosmotheandrism. It could also be disproved if this immaterial bridge can be explained from within the material universe.
Now, no one can conceive the inconceivable or imagine the unimaginable. However, sometimes a thing can be so inconceivable that we slide right over its inconceivability and imagine we have conceived it, often because we have a word for it — the quintessential case being the word “God,” which can imply that we know what we’re talking about just because we have the word. But the same is true of the word “Cosmos,” since we can again never know in advance what this temporally unfolding event has in store for us and what secrets it will reveal. And of course the same applies to the Anthropos, both in general and in particular, i.e., the bottomlessness of our own selves.
And toplessness.
Correct: can’t have one without the other.
∞
It comes back to principles: atheism cannot be its own first principle, because it is in principle not possible unless we have free will, or in other words, unless human beings are somehow liberated from necessity and ordered to truth.
The intellect must also be immaterial, since belief of any kind is a spiritual act. But if it is a spiritual act, then... well, it doesn’t necessarily prove the existence of the Theos, only of an immaterial soul-thingy, as stipulated above.
But what is that, and how does it get here? What is its sufficient reason, since matter cannot be the cause of the immaterial. Put conversely, in what world does it make sense for spirit to disprove the existence of spirit?
Let’s think this through. Certainly we can stipulate that human beings have the capacity or potential for atheism. Like anyone else atheists have the freedom to know truth, both knowledge and freedom being ineluctably immaterial. No animal could be a theist or atheist, due to the absence of a spiritual intellect with its immaterial faculties.
So, there is no way around the conclusion that only a human being is capable of atheism, because lower animals lack the freedom and intelligence to be capable of it. Therefore, it seems that belief in atheism requires a little intelligence, but not too much, otherwise it will recognize the performative contradiction it entails.
But that’s not entirely fair, since there are plenty of highly intelligent atheists with IQs that dwarf mine, for example, Stephen Hawking, who comes in at 160. On the other hand, Einstein’s IQ is estimated to have been as high as 190, and he was not an atheist (although not a conventional believer).
So, if intelligence neither supports nor refutes atheism, what does?
Two words: vertical closure. For a self-enclosed person can reach no telos beyond himself, and the atheist would say that this is because there is no telos. But what if there is a terminus — a transcendent telos — beyond ourselves?
Thanks to Freud, we know all about repression, which is of the “lower vertical” content of the unconscious. But if verticality extends upward to, and downward from, the source or ground of the Cosmos, then there could also be a kind of upper vertical repression, and why not? If so, it would account for how people can become enclosed in their absurcularity. In a way, their worldview is complete (on its own level), and yet, it is radically incomplete (with regard to the whole).
∞
Now, can an atheist actually be a philosopher? For it seems that atheism is not a theory, rather, a necessary consequence of some prior ontological commitment such as metaphysical naturalism. Atheism is not even a belief (or unbelief), rather, just the entailment of a prior principle of vertical closure.
The question is, how did the atheist arrive at this principle, and why is he committed to it? For the first seems arbitrary, the second subjective. And arbitrary + subjective = crazy in most any other context.
It also ignores the question of why there should be metaphysical principles from which entailments logically follow, and how man could ever know them, supposing he is a wholly immanent and naturalistic being.
In other words, if man were a wholly material phenomenon, then by definition he could never know it. Whatever else a principle is, it isn’t material. Nor is the intellect that knows and accedes to the principle something material.
In short, we can know we are material, which means we can’t be. That is to say, there is something that transcends materiality in the merest knowledge of matter. Immanence can deny transcendence, but in so doing affirms it.
Atheists like to think of themselves as highly rational, but reason cannot furnish the premises upon which it operates. Rather, we must choose the premises on some other nonrational — which is not to say irrational — basis. It can be intuition, or authority, or common sense, or some kind of tacit knowing a la Polanyi, etc.
Take the classic example: all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, ergo Socrates is mortal. The form of the syllogism is prior to what we plug into it. Now, what if man has an immortal soul? Obviously the syllogism can’t tell us one way or the other.
But if the human soul is immaterial and the immaterial isn’t subject to decay or decomposition, then we’ve used another syllogism to disprove the first, and prove that Socrates isn’t mortal after all.
Besides, Socrates certainly didn’t think so — rather, he believed in the soul’s immortality — so he would be the first to disagree with the conclusion of any syllogism that uses logic to deny his own transcendental condition.
But in olden times, an atheist was someone who didn’t believe in and honor the local gods. By this criteria I am atheist, since I don’t believe in secular materialism, eliminativism, determinism, or other tall tales of the tenured.
Certainly atheism supposes a godlike ability to pronounce on the nature of reality. But in the end it’s just the same old immanence denying transcendence, or thoughts denying the thinker — the thinker again being situated between the poles of immanence and transcendence. Atheism is another social imaginary imagining its own consistency and completeness.








