Only ideas save us from adjectives. —Dávila
Reset: we’ve discussed numbers one and two of our five certitudes, each of these being certain, everlasting, necessary, always, present in everyone’s experience, and not subject to error. They are impossible to refute without eliminating both the refuted and refuter, for they are the incontrovertible certainties possessed by every human being. They are immediately present on the ground floor of any act of cognition, and indeed necessary for the existence of truth itself.
Stripping out all the adjectives, our first two may sound rather trivial: that 1) there exists a world of things, independent of our thinking of them; and that 2) in this world, there is myself, the I who knows the world. But we have to start somewhere, and it is surprising how many philosophers start somewhere else.
Cosmotheandrism frames these principles somewhat differently, what with our 12 Axioms, beginning with certitude (Axiom 1). One might say that the first content of this certitude is Livi’s five principles. Moreover, certitude is necessarily certain about something, this irreducible aboutness going to Axiom 4, relational interiority, since objects relate to subjects and vice versa. Likewise, our two terms are open to one another (Axiom 3), and constitute a primordial complementarity (Axiom 2).
∞
Coming in at #3 is “The evidence of the existence of beings analogous to me, in an existential situation of intersubjectivity.” Thus, we are on solid ground in affirming that “in the world, there are others, similar to me, with whom I communicate.” This we know with absolute certitude, unless you don’t exist and I am not communicating.
Contrary to Sartres, hell is no other people.
Yes, because as we discussed above, the very possibility of I Am and You Are is grounded in a prior We of intersubjectivity and interior relations. This anterior unity bifurcates into I and Thou: a human relationship is not like two extrinsically related objects, rather, intrinsically related subjects. Remove this intersubjectivity and the existence of others would indeed be a kind of hell, since they would just be in the way. Note that for a sociopath, for example, other people are indeed just in the way of their impulses and desires. Others are to be used and cast aside like any other It.
This was touched on in the Introduction vis-à-vis any philosopher’s prior commitment to the notion that he can successfully communicate his true ideas to other minds via some medium, whether a speech, a book, or an interpretive dance cycle. In a way, #3 might actually be #1, since a monadic subject devoid of intersubjectivity would be an ontological non-starter. In other words, even communicating Livi’s five principles presupposes an intersubjective means of communication. We are fundamentally relational, such that we have the ability to see I to I from the first spark of the primordial We.
Nor are the objects we encounter in the world mute, rather, speak to the human subject in such a way that they betray a kind of intersubjectivity of their own that is built into the Cosmic Area Rug. In short, intersubjectivity is actually everywhere, not just between human subjects.
∞
Certitude #4 brings the Ought into the Is, which is to say, “The evidence of the existence of laws of a moral type” (Livi), or what is typically called the natural law which regulates the relations between persons: “my relation with others and the relation of the others with me are relations different from physical relations, because they imply rights and duties’” (ibid.). Again, with the exception of sociopaths or otherwise dysfunctional individuals, we spontaneously know better than to treat people like that.
Like what?
Like objects. Frankly, we shouldn’t even treat objects that way, for example, the environment. Rather, we are caretakers who take care of objects, depending on their value.
We might say that rights and duties co-arise, which implies freedom and responsibility. Not to presuppose anything about the Theos, but again no responsible being would give freedom to an irresponsible one. We all know better than to hand the car keys over to a five year old, or entrust animals to regulate the zoo. We don’t put wolves in charge of the henhouse or reptiles of the mousehouse.
No, the Cosmic Area Rug has oughtness woven into it, for example, that we ought to know truth and ought not treat others as we do not wish to be treated. In fact, the Ten Commandments or Eight Noble Truths of Buddhism are essentially lists of Oughts and Ought Nots that provide explicit content for Livi’s fourth principle: do not lie, steal, or murder, which presuppose truth and private property, up to and including property in oneself. In the case of Buddhism, we ought to know the true nature of reality, speak honestly, and live in a way that doesn’t harm or exploit others.
Marx, for example, suggested that private property is theft, when in actuality Marxism in practice is theft of our natural rights—
These are, uh, valued properties.
Yes, and there is no flippin’ reason we should allow any philosopher to essentially steal the Cosmic Area Rug by denying any of our first four principles. This aggression will not stand.
Having said that, Among a few words it is as difficult to hide as among a few trees.
Our first four principles are those few trees amongst which we cannot hide: It is, I am, You are, and I Ought.








