We are now over 100 posts into the Trilogy, so I can’t recall if we’ve already discussed Hartshorne’s dipolar theism.
Isn’t that your job?
What, avoiding repetition? No, it’s the editor’s job, and I don’t have one of those. However, I do read a lot of books, and can’t help noticing that most authors not only repeat themselves but often spend their lives belaborating a single theme.
What’s yours?
Not a bad question. Looking back, beginning with my doctoral dissertation, I think it can be reduced to One Cosmos, Three Poles, Twelve Axioms, and a lotta laffs. All along there have been certain implicit themes, but this book is the attempt to render them explicit. Supposing the following passage is redundant, I will at least endeavor to make it entertaining:
Cosmotheandrism unapologetically pilfers Hartshorne’s extremely helpful concept of dipolar theism, the purpose of which being to counteract one of man’s perennial approaches to the Theos, which is to divide it in two and then overvalue one side while denigrating the other, when in reality there are better and worse forms of each contrast. However, cosmotheandrism goes one better and posits a tripolar theism.
For Hartshorne, man has a persistent tendency to mistake a half-truth of his own making for the whole truth he could never make, and then be confused by the paradoxes that ensue. More generally, absurdity always follows whenever we cut reality in two and then reify the division, whether we inflict the dualism on the Cosmos, Anthropos, or Theos. But doing so to the latter carries the extra penalty of idolatry — or of G3AOA.
The Creator creates genuine co-creators, and if our own creativity is determined by God, then it is no more creative or free than what a machine inevitably does. Hartshorne felt that his conception of God was not only more metaphysically coherent and consistent with human experience, but was more impressive than the distant, impassive, and immutable God of tradition.
In fact, this dipolar God is the one in whom believers already believe, in the sense that, for example, belief in the efficacy of prayer implicitly assumes that God hears and responds — and to the extent that he does, this implies some kind of change in God. There are theologians who twist themselves into pretzels to deny this truth, but why all the hostility directed at change? How can one be changeless and responsive? That’s not a proper orthoparadox but an oxymoron.
We certainly wouldn’t consider it a virtue if a human person were impassive, unrelated, and absolutely resistant to change. Rather, it is a matter of what kind of change. Hartshorne concludes that God is both the most Absolute conceivable but also the most Relative, in that he is related to everything and everyone. In this sense, he is at once the unmoved mover and the most moved mover. Which sounds like a violation of the principle of non-contradiction, but it’s really a complementary dynamism.
Any apparent contradiction disappears if we regard change and changelessness under different aspects. Yes, God never changes insofar as his nature is concerned. But this nature includes responsiveness — a “being with,” not just a being apart from everything else. Which tracks with our Axiom 11, irreducible substance-in-relation, which applies to us because it first applies to the Godhead.
Thus, it should come as no surprise that God creates a Cosmos that is so densely interconnected, such that not so much as a single atom isn’t woven into a web of internal relations. This same principle accounts for our own intersubjectivity, such that we are again “members of one another” — this being the horizontal expression of God’s own intersubjectivity, or in the cosmotheandric words of Jesus: I am in my Father, and you are in me, and I am in you. This clearly implies a three-way, reciprocal relationship: Jesus is in and with the Father, and believers are integrated into this divine tri-unity. How is any of this reconcilable with changelessness? A God who is responsive without being contingent is the only one who can logically sustain a real relationship with creation and account for the vertical causation that lifts us out of horizontal absurcularity.
Surely this tripolarity renders God more approachable and relatable than an immutable and impassive one. Jesus himself is said to be Immanuel, which literally means God with us. Now, is God really with us or not? Because if he is, this means he is with us in all our contingency and finitude, so not the distant and unresponsive stuffed shirt of tradition. Isn’t the whole point of this revolutionary idea of the Incarnation that God personally intervenes and resides with humanity, bridging the gap between the Anthropos and Theos and making a permanent, intimate relationship possible? Nor is a relationship even a relationship — let alone an intimate one — if one of the parties isn’t really involved in it. You know the type.
Objection!
By whom?
By the Wise, who inform us that God does not change because he cannot change. Moreover, he knows everything in a single instant before it ever undergoes the formality of occurring in time, because there is no “before” or “after” in eternity.
You have articulated the traditional view, which was quintessentially expressed by old Boethius, who defined eternity as “the complete, simultaneous, and perfect possession of interminable life,” such that all of time is equally and immediately “now” to God.
Conversely, for those of us who must deal with the unpredictable ups and downs or strikes and gutters of time, we experience a movement from a determined past to an open future. But if God sees and knows all our actions in a single, unchanging, eternal present, then the future has already happened — much like Einstein’s block universe in which time is but a “stubborn illusion.”
This is a metaphysical headscratcher, because it sure does seem like the past is something fundamentally different from the future. We cannot change the past, nor can we know the future, and we can only actually live in the present. Nevertheless, we are asked to believe that there can be no causation in eternity, since this would require time for the effect of the cause to come into being. Which is a gratuitous assertion, certainly not one that is capable of proof. In other words, it simply defines its terms ahead of time, so it is true by definition — end of deuscussion. More problematically, it renders the very source of intelligibility unintelligible if not absurd.
To begin with, it is again difficult to see how immutability can be reconciled with freedom, for If determinism is real, if only that can happen which must happen, then error does not exist. Error supposes that something happened that should not have. Substitute “sin” for “error,” and we see that in a fully God-determined universe sin does not and cannot exist, insofar as it was necessarily caused by God. Or rather, he doesn’t cause it, it just IS in his Eternal Now. But if God’s Eternal Now includes all our tomorrows, then tomorrow is already yesterday for God, and our future sins have already been committed. Does this make sense to you? If so, then go away and sin no more. Or keep right on sinning, since in either case you’re off the hook because God is in the saddle.
Surely there is a better way to approach this subject, one that preserves our genuine — which to say, undetermined — freedom. This aphorism provides a big hint: The permanent possibility of initiating causal series is what we call a person. This is key to our real freedom, being that we are persons, so the future is open and we have the power to make choices that will contribute to this or that outcome.
Now God is not only personal, but because personal, interpersonal. And our own interpersonal personhood is an icon and entailment of his personhood. But if he is the kind of absolutely immovable being described by tradition, then he lacks the causal power we human persons possess. There can be no causation in eternity, since cause and effect require time, for which reason everything has already happened. Moreover, supposing God is unmoved by his creation, this actually makes him less than a person, not more. It would mean we possess a perfection — empathic and loving responsiveness — that God lacks, which is another headscratching non-starter.
Christians say God is love.
That goes to one of Hartshorne’s metaphysical dealbreakers, even though he was by no means any kind of normative Christian. But it does imply that something is happening up there — for example, Lover, Beloved, and the Love that passes between them. These are real distinctions, nor can they be reconciled with a timeless blob of Pure Now. Rather, the Godhead must be a kind of eternal dance, not a static entity — what is called perichoresis.
Perichoresis — sometimes translated as “rotation” or “dance” — describes the eternal relationships within the Godhead. It affirms that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three distinct Persons who are perpetually and perfectly united, eternally giving, loving, and sharing the single divine essence. The dance metaphor emphasizes this relational dynamism and its continuous movement.
Not to belabor the point, but how can this delightful movement be reconciled with an unmoved mover, when this eternally perichoretic God again looks more like the most moved mover?
God leaves it all on the dance floor of eternity?
Yes, and tomorrow we will further discuss the nature of the giant disco ball in the sky.








