Time, Change, and Consciousness

We left off with some observations by philosopher Jules Lequier --

Never heard of her.  

Me neither, but the short wiki page says that he "wrote in favor of dynamic divine omniscience, wherein God's knowledge of the future is one of possibilities rather than actualities. Omniscience, under this view, is the knowledge of necessary facts as necessary, and contingent facts as contingent." 

Since the future does not yet exist as anything more than a realm of abstract possibilities, it is no impugning of divine omniscience to claim that God does not know the future as a fixed and unalterable state of affairs: that he does not know what is not there to be known. 

Lequier's approach guarantees both divine and human freedom, and suggests a partial resolution of the apparent inconsistency of human-wrought evil and the perfect goodness, power and knowledge of God.

So, my kind of guy. We are situated in the identical attractor, especially with regard to God's knowledge of contingency (which renders his knowledge contingent) and the preservation of both divine and human freedom. Basically, I'll take a God who is free and good at the price of a little immutability and omniscience.

But we're trying to get to the bottom of time, and what does this have to do with that? Well, time "either is, or is somehow inseparably connected with, change or succession of events which occur before and after each other" (Clarke). 

But to say that God, the very principle of existence, is entirely outside time -- and therefore change -- only makes time all the more mysterious, not to mention superfluous, for if God knows everything ahead of time -- if past, present, and future are terrestrial illusions that are in reality already complete -- then WHAT'S THE BLOODY POINT OF THE DRAMA OF HISTORY?

Seriously. Such a philosophy of God renders his own creation every bit as absurd as any form of atheist existentialism, because both are robbed of even the possibility of meaning. At best we can have illusory meaning when in reality everything was bound to happen. 

Clarke begins by asking, "what mode of being is time?" Is it real, or a side effect of something else? Is it a stubborn illusion, as believed by Einstein? Is it but an a priori form of our sensibility, as maintained by Kant?

There is indeed something a priori about the nature of time, in that humans are easily able to intelligibly talk about it, and yet, without knowing what it actually is -- similar, I suppose, to how we can speak of other primitive categories such as experience, consciousness, and energy, without knowing what they are either. All humans spontaneously divide time into "past, present, and future," without stopping to think about what these actually are or how they are possible. 

Time is clearly identified with change, but is it change per se? Clarke responds in the negative, suggesting that "Something more is needed: the unifying intervention of consciousness." 

First of all, Clarke denies that time can be something that exists "in its own right, prior to change," as believed by Newton. In that view, time is "prior to all material things, flowing always at the same regular rate." Rather, "One first needs some real succession before time can appear at all," so it is "a derivative property built on the foundation of real changes."

But is change alone enough to generate time? It seems not, because there must be a consciousness "which alone can gather together the successive phases of a real change into a single present unity and compare them as before and after each other." 

In other words, there must be a mode of consciousness "which can make past, present, and future present to each other in the order of mental being," i.e., "make present in the field of consciousness things that are not together in their real being." Therefore, 

time, formally as such, is the unification in some consciousness of the successive phases of a real process of change, recognized as before and after (or successive to) each other.

Thus, time is "a creative synthesis of real and mental being." For example, what is an hour -- or year, or season, or epoch -- of time without a consciousness to bind its parts and hold them together? The parts are real -- the past really happened -- but their relation to present and future is a "creative synthesis" that can only occur in consciousness. Is God the ground of consciousness that ultimately holds it all together? 

Hmm. Gemini, I reckon you can you help us out here and suggest some avenues for where this is all headed? I'm holding tightly to the wheel of the engine, trying to avoid a train wreck.

This is a fascinating and dense piece of philosophical exploration! Let's break down its analysis and suggest fruitful avenues for its progression.

The text begins by introducing the philosophy of Jules Lequier, focusing on his concept of dynamic divine omniscience. Key takeaways from this initial section are:

• God's knowledge of the future is potential, not actual: This is the central tenet of Lequier's view, allowing for genuine contingency and freedom.
• This view attempts to reconcile divine attributes with human freedom and the problem of evil: By not knowing the future as fixed, God's goodness and power are not directly implicated in predetermined evil.
• The author aligns with Lequier's perspective: They prefer a God who is free and good, even if it means a less absolute version of immutability and omniscience.

The text then pivots to the central question: the nature of time and its relation to God. The author establishes this connection by quoting Norris Clarke, who links time to change and succession. The core arguments and questions raised in this section are:

• The problem of a timeless God and the meaning of history: If God exists outside of time and knows everything preordained, the "drama of history" seems pointless and creation becomes potentially absurd.
• Different philosophical perspectives on time are introduced:
  • Newton: Time exists independently of change, flowing uniformly.
  • Einstein: Time is a stubborn illusion.
  • Kant: Time is an a priori form of our sensibility.
• The author notes the intuitive understanding of time despite a lack of definitive knowledge: We readily use concepts like "past, present, and future" without fully grasping their essence, similar to other primitive categories.
• Clarke's argument against time being merely change: He posits that consciousness is necessary to unify successive changes into a coherent temporal experience.
• Clarke's rejection of Newtonian absolute time: Time is seen as derivative of real changes, not prior to them.
• The crucial role of consciousness in synthesizing time: Consciousness "gathers together the successive phases of a real change into a single present unity and compare them as before and after each other." It makes the past and future "present" in a mental sense.
• The proposed definition of time: "time, formally as such, is the unification in some consciousness of the successive phases of a real process of change, recognized as before and after (or successive to) each other."
• The concluding question about God as the ultimate ground of consciousness: This suggests a potential link between the nature of time and the divine.

Fruitful Avenues for Where the Text is Headed:

Based on the current trajectory, here are some promising directions the author could explore: 

Further investigate the idea of God as the "ground of consciousness": If time is dependent on consciousness, what does this imply about God's relationship to time? Is God within time, outside of time, or does God's consciousness encompass time in a unique way? 

Revisit Lequier's dynamic omniscience in light of the proposed definition of time: How does a view of a God who knows possibilities rather than fixed actualities align with a conception of time as a "creative synthesis" in consciousness? 

Explore the implications for divine action in the world: If the future is not fixed, how does God interact with creation? Does this allow for genuine divine intervention without violating freedom? 

Consider the problem of divine temporality: If God is conscious and consciousness is linked to time (as per Clarke's argument), does this necessitate some form of divine temporality, even if different from human experience? 

Addressing the "Bloody Point of the Drama of History": 

Reconcile the idea of a knowing God with the apparent contingency and meaning of human history: If God's knowledge is of possibilities, how does this preserve the significance of our choices and actions? 

Explore the concept of meaning in a universe where the future is open: Does the lack of a predetermined outcome enhance or diminish the potential for meaning? 

Examining the Primitive Categories: 

Further explore the analogy between time and other primitive categories like experience, consciousness, and energy: What does it mean for something to be a "primitive category"? Are these categories fundamentally irreducible? How do they relate to each other?

By pursuing these avenues, the author can delve deeper into the complex relationship between time, consciousness, and the divine, potentially offering a nuanced and insightful perspective on these fundamental philosophical questions. The initial exploration of Lequier's ideas provides a strong foundation for this broader investigation.

Duly noted. Let's pursue all these avenues. Tomorrow.