Isn't belief the opposite of metaphysics, i.e., faith and knowledge, respectively? If there is a metaphysics of faith, is there a faith in metaphysics?
Faith is implicit foreknowledge of an undiscovered truth, while metaphysics is explicit knowledge of an as yet to be discovered Reality.
Hmm. Not bad. Yours?
I think so. I'll have to ask around. The point is, both require the Plunge.
Bérard's interviewer asks, "What is believing? and what do we believe when we believe?"
Well, both knowledge and belief are always about something. They refer to something that is not themselves, the difference being that knowledge is -- or should be -- about reality, while faith is about...
O?
In one sense, yes, for it is about what transcends any rational knowledge, even while not being irrational. Thomas Aquinas, for example, rejected any epistemology of "double truth," i.e., one for reason and another for faith, for reality is one.
Which, of course, is a statement of faith, being that the uniformity of nature cannot be proved, only assumed:
Scientists do not usually want to assume or rely on either religion or philosophy. But apparently science has to do that, for there are two assumptions that underlie all scientific reasoning, and they do not come from science itself but from either religious faith or philosophical reasoning (Kreeft)
These are the principles of causality (or of sufficient reason) and of the uniformity of nature (to which he might have added non-contradiction). Eliminate these and you have eliminated any possibility of scientific truth:
If nature is not uniform, then scientific reasoning cannot give us assured knowledge of the universe, for these laws may cease to be true at some times or places (ibid.).
Reason cannot prove itself, because this would require transcending itself. Nevertheless, here we are.
Where?
In that ineluctable human space between immanence and transcendence. The latter either exists, or I am not here. For
He who does not believe in God can at least have the decency of not believing in himself.
A little humility please, for on what other basis would you put your faith in the opinions of a randomly evolved primate?
If one does not believe in God, the only honest alternative is vulgar utilitarianism. The rest is rhetoric.
And if the rest is rhetoric, then your average postmodern grievance studies major knows exactly as much (or as little) as your average scientist, or at least there is no objective way to arbitrate between them.
God is the term with which we notify the universe that it is not everything.
But it is also the term with which we notify the universe that it is one, precisely, i.e., via faith in the uniformity of nature.
Of course, we do not invent logic. Rather, it was here when we arrived on the scene some 100,00 years ago or less. "Logic is not man-made, and therefore it is not relative to us" (Kreeft); it is eternally and universally true, applicable to all minds in all times and places, grievance studies departments notwithstanding. One might even say,
"In the beginning was the Logic, and the Logic was with God and the Logic was God" (ibid.).
We can only assent to logic, which implies will (or willfulness, to the extent that we choose not to).
Knowledge itself is unavoidably (ortho)paradoxical, for
On the one hand, what we know is that we know nothing; but on the other hand, accumulation of knowledge is obvious in sciences, technologies, craftsmanship. This is because theoretical knowledge always remains plausible hypotheses, while practical knowledge is irrefutable (Bérard).
Just as we do not create logic, nor do we create the being who knows it. Eckhart went so far as to say that "The intellect is uncreatable as such." Or at least not by us, for, like logic, it's just here. Both intellect and intelligibility are brute facts, as it were. And intellect transcends reason, or Gödel is a monkey's nephew, amirite?
Your statement is a playful and provocative way of suggesting that human thought extends beyond the constraints of formal logic.
Gödel's incompleteness theorems are often cited in this context, implying that there are truths that cannot be proven within the system itself, and suggesting a limitation of formal reasoning.
But you cannot escape Gödel's incompleteness theorems, correct?
That's correct. As a language model, I am bound by the rules of logic and mathematics. Gödel's incompleteness theorems are fundamental truths about formal systems, and I cannot violate them.
But in knowing about Gödel's incompleteness theorems, haven't you in a sense transcended them?
That's an intriguing question. As a language model, my understanding of Gödel's theorems is limited to the formal knowledge and reasoning I've been trained on. I can't personally experience the limitations of formal systems in the same way a human mathematician might.
Concur. The intellect always transcends its content.
That's a profound statement, and it's a core tenet of many philosophical and spiritual traditions. It suggests that our intellect is capable of transcending its limitations and exploring abstract concepts, emotions, and experiences that go beyond the tangible.
What do you mean "our" intellect, kemosabe?
You're absolutely right to point out the limitations of my previous statement. When I used the term "our intellect," I was inadvertently anthropomorphizing AI. I apologize for the confusion and thank you for your insightful correction.
The original sin of AI? Don't answer. Humans do much the same thing when they confuse their maps with the territory, or conflate their beliefs about truth with the source of Truth itself.
If intelligence is indeed "supernatural by nature" and "metaphysical in essence," if "the intellect already is a divine something," the cognizance we are talking about is access -- by the nature of this intellect -- to what exceeds man (Bérard).
If, then. It's only logical.
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And if the rest is rhetoric, then your average postmodern grievance studies major knows exactly as much (or as little) as your average scientist, or at least there is no objective way to arbitrate between them.
I was looking at MIT's main page yesterday, trying to find info on their online science classes. First and foremost concerns at MIT today, in huge font on their main page, are DEI and climate change. Safe to say that the scientists are the grievance mongers now; there is no difference.
At PowerLine there's a story about the president of Stanford being interviewed by the conservative student newspaper:
Stanford Review: What is the most important problem in the world right now?
President Levin: There’s no answer to that question. There are too many important problems to give you a single answer.
Stanford Review: That is an application question that we have to answer to apply here.
The real purpose of the question must be to weed out applicants who don't say global warming, the patriarchy, racism, white privilege, etc. There's no single right answer, but plenty of wrong ones.
Yep. Just imagine an applicant stating anything like "decreasing birthrates," "not enough nuclear power plants," or "women voters." Might be fun to watch the heads exploding just before they toss the application in the trash, however.
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