Saying the Most with the Least: Being Is

Gödel's theorems mean that no matter how complete the formal system, it will always leave a semantic residue: semantics cannot be reduced to syntax, meaning to grammar, reality to mathematics, quality to quantity, etc. This seems intuitively obvious, but it's nice to have logic on one's side. 

Now, don't blame Gödel for my misuse of him, but Being cannot be reduced to any formal system. Or, in the words of the Aphorist, 

What's weird about this is that 1) we know damn well that Being is, and that 2) we can never know Being as such, only such and such a being. Nothing that is can stand apart from being and view it from the outside, since such a thing does not exist, i.e., is non-being precisely. 

Why is it that the statement Being Is isn't just a meaningless tautology or pleonasm? What even is the distinction between "Being" and "Is"? Well, let's think this through...

Everything that exists is, i.e., partakes of Being. But perhaps the first thing a human qua human notices is that some things come into being and pass out of it, such that their being is contingent. Turns out that even the cosmos is contingent; not only is it not its own cause, but it will surely pass away away into heat death.

Even so, it will never pass into nothing, for Being itself can never not-be, which implies Necessary Being, in contrast to our contingent being. 

But here again, to even know of Necessary Being implies some kind of contact with eternity, since necessity is convertible to eternity in this or any other conceivable cosmos. 

As Thomas says, "Everything eternal is necessary." Moreover, 

The further a being is distant from that which is Being of itself, namely God, the nearer it is to nothingness. But the nearer a being stands to God, the further away it is from nothingness. 

Which clearly implies a kind of verticality, a spectrum running from Being to nothingness, even though Being can only tend to the latter, since nothingness is precisely what is not and cannot be. If it could be, it would not be nothing. 

Indeed, even the concept of nothing is still something. Concepts have some kind of being, although distinct from material being, more on which in a subsequent post. 

Now, every being must have a cause outside itself, except for Necessary Being, which is by definition uncaused. Here again, contingent being points to Necessary Being. Of this we can again be certain. As Renard explains, creatures

are not their "to be," but have a "to be" really distinct from their essence [and] are not a sufficient reason for existence to themselves.

On the next page he has a helpful metacosmic flowchart, which proceeds from the principle of Being, which leads directly to the principle of non-contradiction, which is to say, that Being is and therefore Non-Being is not.   

Which leads directly to the Principle of Intelligibility, which is to say that Every being is intelligible, for Whatever is has its sufficient reason for existing. 

Which entails the Principle of Causality, which is to say, Whatever is contingent has its sufficient reason for existing from another. 

Turns out there are indeed reasons for things, such that Every contingent being has an efficient cause. Which is what we call "knowledge," from scientific to philosophical to metaphysical knowledge. 

Conversely, if things have no reasons, then knowledge of them is impossible, for they would be arbitrary. Science surely tells us what is, but is necessarily silent as to why things are, much less why they are s'durn intelligible, this being the job of metaphysics.

In short, knowledge is knowledge of causes. But the causes cannot go on forever, i.e., to infinitude, for an endless series of effects is absurd. Thus causality is a metaphysical principle without which knowledge is impossible. Again, causality is simply the principle of knowledge: "if the cause is denied, reason is useless and knowledge void" (Renard).

Ultimately, "The end is the cause of causes, because it is the cause of causality in all causes." Which seems pretty clear. But since causality is bound up with knowledge, it seems that this presupposes some kind of intellect; in other words, the first cause must be intelligent. 

Thus, supposing we are ruthlessly rational and consistent, "we must at last reach the first intellect which is its own act, its own end, and its own 'to be,'" and why not? What is the alternative? 

Renard concludes this section with the affirmation that He Is, and is "THE FIRST PRINCIPLE AND THE LAST END OF ALL."

Which, hmm, implies a kind or circularity in the vertical hierarchy alluded to above. Is this the way it is? I have my suspicions. Yada yada, let's flip forward to the penultimate sentence of the book, that

our intellect faintly perceives the true meaning of limited beings participating in THE BEING THAT IS.

Thus we rearrive at 

the affirmation of the supreme efficient cause, who is the ultimate end, and the source of all Truth, Goodness, and Beauty.  

Works for me, but of course there's much more to say, i.e., still a lotta ins and outs, lotta what-have-you's, lotta strands to keep in old Gagdad's head. Let's conclude with some Thomisms, and resume the discussion tomorrow:

Each particular knowledge is derived from some completely certain knowledge, which is not subject to error.

This ordering of the intellect to infinity would be vain and senseless if there were no infinite object of knowledge.

The source of every imperfect thing lies necessarily in one perfect being.

Each single being is perfect in the measure in which it reaches up to its own origin.

The complete perfection of the universe demands that there should be created natures which return to God.

The final happiness of man consists in this -- that in his soul is reflected the order of the whole universe.